Abstract-Secure message transmission assumes n channels between a sender and a receiver such that up to t channels are under the control of a computationally unlimited adversary. In secure message transmission by public discussion protocol, sender and receiver have access to a public authenticated channel. In this paper we show that if n ≥ t + 1, a secure protocol requires at least 3 rounds of communication and 2 rounds invocation of the public channel. This gives a complete answer to a question raised by Garay and Ostrovsky in Eurocrypt 2008. We also describe a round optimal protocol that has constant transmission rate over the public channel.
I. INTRODUCTION Dolev, Dwork, Waarts and Yung [1] introduced Secure Message Transmission (SMT) systems to address the problem of delivering a message chosen by a sender S to a receiver R in a network guaranteeing reliability and privacy. In the SMT model S is connected to R by n node disjoint paths, referred to as wires, of them at most t is controlled by the adversary with unlimited computational power. One of the main motivations for this model is to reduce connectivity requirement in secure multiparty protocols. Traditionally these protocols require a secure and reliable channel between every two nodes. This assumption cannot be satisfied in many scenarios and so it is natural to study implementation of secure and reliable point-topoint communication in these networks under reasonable assumptions. A perfectly secure message transmission or PSMT for short, guarantees that R always receive the sent message but the adversary does not learn anything about it.
The original definition of perfect security and privacy was relaxed by Franklin and Wright [4] who considered SMT protocols with probabilistic security, referred to as almost SMT protocols in this paper. Almost SMT protocols have two parameters ε and δ, where ε upper bounds the advantage of the adversary in breaking privacy, and δ upper bounds the probability that R fails to recover the sent message. The special case with ε = δ = 0 is a PSMT protocol.
Connectivity requirements of PSMT protocols for different number of rounds and constructions of optimal protocols have been widely studied [1] , [3] , [7] . In particular it was shown that PSMT is possible if and only if n ≥ 2t + 1. Franklin and Wright [4] considered a model where an additional reliable broadcast channel is available to S and R. A broadcast channel guarantees that all nodes of the network receive the same message. We refer to the model as Broadcast Model (BM). It was shown that PSMT in BM requires n ≥ 2t + 1 but probabilistic security can be obtained with n > t. The paper [4] also presented a 3-round (0, δ) protocol in BM.
Efficiency parameters of SMT protocols are, (i) the number of rounds which counts the number of consecutive interactions between S and R, and (ii) the communication complexity measured in terms of transmission rate which is the total number of bits sent over all wires for a message divided by the length of the message.
Garay and Ostrovsky [6] relaxed the requirement of the broadcast model by replacing the broadcast channel with an authentic and reliable public channel that connects S and R. A public channel is totally susceptible to eavesdropping but is immune to tampering. We refer to this communication model as Public Discussion Model (PDM). In PDM security against t corrupted wires requires n > t which is the same as BM. A protocol in PDM has round complexity (r, r ) if it uses r rounds in total, and in r rounds the public channel is invoked (0 < r ≤ r). Garay et al. proposed a (4, 3)-round protocol and subsequently improved it [5] to a (3, 2)-round protocol. However, the question of optimality of this protocol remained open.
Related models: Pubic discussion have been used in other contexts including unconditionally secure key agreement [8] . In secure key agreement, public channel is used in the advantage distillation, information reconciliation and privacy amplification phases where the two parties exchange messages over a public channel to obtain consistent and high-entropy strings (keys).
A. Motivation
SMT protocols are the main building block of secure multiparty protocols when players are connected by incomplete point-to-point networks. SMTs in PDM can efficiently realize secure and reliable point-to-point channels in the above case, with small connectivity requirement (n > t) and so constructing optimal protocols in PDM will be of high interest. In this paper we focus on optimality of the number of rounds and transmission rate over the public channel.
The best known result in PDM is a (3, 2)-rounds protocol [5] that has O(n) transmission rate over the wires and the public channel, both. The motivation of our work is optimality of the protocol in terms of the number of rounds and/or transmission rate. 
, [5] , (Theorem 3)
[4], [5] : O(n) on wires and public channel ours: O(n) on wires and O(1) on public channel when the length of message is Ω((n log
We will find the minimum values of r and r for which an (r, r )-round ( , δ) protocol can exist. As noted earlier the results in [4] shows that for t + 1 ≤ n ≤ 2t it is possible to have perfect privacy ( = 0) but not perfect reliability.
For transmission rate we will focus on reducing the rate over the public channel. This is because of the high cost attached to the implementation of such channels.
Implementation of the public channel. Public channels in multiparty settings can be constructed by invoking almosteverywhere broadcast protocol [6] that will require almosteverywhere Byzantine agreement protocol [2] and so can be realized using the traditional Byzantine agreement protocol. It is shown [11] that for agreement on 1 bit using almosteverywhere agreement protocols in degree-bounded networks at least O(log N ) rounds is required, where N is the number of nodes in the network.
A public authenticated channel can be also realized using a message authentication protocol in the manual channel model [9] where the sender and the receiver are connected by an insecure channel and a low bandwidth channel called manual channel. Naor et al. [9] showed message authentication in this model requires at least 3 rounds and sends at least 2 log 1/ε bits over the manual channel, where 0 < ε < 1 accounts for the failure probability of the protocol.
This means that implementing public discussion using such authentication protocols will be very costly and it is essential to reduce invocation of public channel.
B. Our Results
Table I summarizes our results. We answer the question of round optimality of SMT protocols in PDM raised in [6] . Our results on round optimality are obtained in two steps.
(i) We prove that there is no (2, 2)-round (ε, δ) protocol in PDM with ε + δ < 1 − 1/|M|, where M denotes the message space.
(ii) We will show that there is no (r ≥ 3, 1)-round (ε, δ) protocol with ε + δ < 1 − 1/|M| and δ < 1 2 (1 − 1/|M|). We construct a round optimal protocol that has constant transmission rate over the public channel when the length of message (i.e., log |M|) is Ω((n log 1 δ )
2 ) bits. The question of optimality of transmission rate over the wires and public channel, remains open. For space limitation proofs can be found in the full paper [10] .
C. Organization
Section 2 describes the security model and relevant definitions. Lower bounds on round complexity of SMT protocol in PDM are proved in Section 3. Section 4 describes an optimal (3, 2)-round (0, δ)-SMT by public discussion protocol.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Model and Notations
Network model. We assume a connected point-to-point incomplete network that is synchronous. Players S and R are connected by n vertex-disjoint paths, called wires. In addition, we assume there is an authentic and reliable public channel between S and R. Messages over this channel are publicly accessible and are correctly delivered to the recipient. All wires and channel are bidirectional. A protocol can be divided into rounds. In each round, a player may send a message on each wire and the public channel. Messages will be delivered before the next round starts. Adversary model. We assume the adversary A is computationally unbounded. A can corrupt players on paths between S and R. A wire is corrupted if at least one node on the path is corrupted. Assume up to t ≤ n−1 wires can be corrupted. A is active and can eavesdrop, modify or block messages sent over the corrupted wires. S and R do not know which wires are corrupted. A is adaptive, which means that in every action it uses its current view of previously corrupted wires and public channel. A static adversary chooses the wires to be corrupted before the start of the protocol and sees the transmissions over all the corrupted wires and the public channel before constructing the transmissions over the corrupted wires in that round. Notations. Let M be the message space. Denote the set of players by P = {S, R, A}. Let M S be the secret message of S, and M R be the message output by R.
B. Definitions
The statistical distance of two random variables X, Y over a set U is given by,
Lemma 1: [12] Let X, Y be two random variables over a set U. The advantage of any computationally unbounded algorithm
In an execution of an SMT protocol Π, S wants to send M S ∈ M to R privately and reliably. We assume that at the end of the protocol, R always outputs a message M R ∈ M. An execution is completely determined by the probability distribution of S for choosing a message, the random coins of all the players. For P ∈ P, the view of P includes the random coins of P and the messages that P receives. Denote by V P (m, c) the view of P when the protocol is run with M S = m and P 's randomness C A = c.
Definition 1: A protocol between S and R is an (ε, δ)-Secure Message Transmission by Public Discussion (SMT-PD) protocol if the following two conditions are satisfied:
• Privacy: For every two messages m 0 , m 1 ∈ M and every c ∈ {0,
where the probability is taken over the randomness of S and R. .
• Reliability: R recovers the message M S with probability
where the probability is taken over the randomness of all the players. Using Definition 1 and Lemma 1, we have, Corollary 1: Let A be an adversary for a (ε, δ)-SMT-PD protocol. Then for any computationally unbounded algorithm D, a message pair m 0 , m 1 ∈ M, the adversary's randomness denoted by c ∈ {0, 1} * , we have
where the probability is over the random coins of S and R.
III. ROUND COMPLEXITY OF SMT-PD PROTOCOL
Franklin and Wright [4] showed that there is no (0, 0)-SMT-PD protocol when n ≤ 2t and this result is independent of the number of rounds. In this section, we will prove that for (ε, δ)-SMT-PD protocols, (3, 2)-round complexity is necessary and sufficient. This is by proving (i) secure (2, 2)-round (ε, δ)-SMT-PD protocols cannot exist, and (ii) for any (r, 1)-round protocol (r ≥ 3) either privacy or reliability can be compromised.
We assume M S is selected by S with uniform distribution. Lemma 2: Let Π be an (ε, δ)-SMT-PD protocol and assume M S is selected randomly with uniform probability. Then no adversary A can correctly guess M S with probability larger than ε + 1/|M|. That is,
where M A denotes the adversary's output, and the probability is over the random coins of S, R, A and M S .
A. Impossibility of (2, 2)-Round (ε, δ)-SMT-PD Protocol
In the following proofs we assume the adversary is static, that is the corrupted wires are selected at the start of the protocol. The impossibility results obtained for such adversary will hold for more powerful adaptive adversaries.
Definition 2: For a (r, r )-round SMT-PD protocol, let f i denote the encoding function that is used to generate the traffic sent over the public channel and the wires in the ith round. f i is a randomized function whose inputs may consist of a player's received messages and their random coins. For a player P ∈ {S, R}, let C P denote the random coins of P , and M j denotes the message received by P in round j (M j is NULL if P receives no message). We
to denote the random variables corresponding to traffic over wires and the public channel in round i; P i denotes the traffic over the public channel, and X i and Y i are the traffic over the two sets of wires each of size t, one all corrupted and one all uncorrupted.
Let g be the decoding function of the protocol and assume R outputs the message
The proof is by contradiction: assume there exists a 2-round (ε, δ) protocol Π with ε + δ < 1 − 1/|M|. We construct an adversary A who breaks the privacy of Π by impersonating R. We show that for any execution of Π when S sends the message m to R, there exists a second execution called swapped execution where S sends the message m and A impersonates R, such that S receives identical traffic in the two executions and so cannot tell them apart. The views of R and A are however swapped in the two executions. Now if R outputs M R = M S in one of the executions, then A outputs M A = M S in the swapped execution and so
Using Lemma 2 and that Π is an ( , δ) protocol, we have ε + δ ≥ 1 − 1/|M| which is a contradiction.
Proof: Let n = 2t. Assume that there is a 2-round (ε, δ) protocol Π with ε + δ < 1 − 1/|M|, and wires are labeled with 1, 2, . . . , n = 2t.
For simplicity, we write A's randomness as two parts: C A = (C A0 , C A1 ), where C A0 ∈ {0, 1} is used to select one of the two complementary sets of t wires for corruption and C A1 ∈ {0, 1} * is used in message encoding and decoding. W.L.O.G., assume that C A0 = 0 and C A0 = 1, respectively, denote that the first and the last t wires are corrupted.
For a 2-round SMT-PD protocol, we consider all possible flows of messages. The first round message can be from R to S, or vice versa. The last round message can only be from S to R as otherwise it can be removed without affecting the output of R. In the following we use "A − B" to mean that A and B are the initiators of the first and second rounds, respectively.
W.L.O.G., assume the last t wires are corrupted (i.e., C A0 = 1). In the first round, R sends
where A R is the value computed from C A1 and results in P 1 , that is transmission over the public channel, to remain unchanged. This is always possible because the function table of f 1 is public and A is computationally unbounded. Thus A can find the set of random strings such that R = {r | f 1 (r) = P 1 X 1 Y 1 } and randomly selects one element of R as A R . A will then replaces Y 1 by Y 1 . In the second round, S generates messages
At this stage A blocks the transmission over the corrupted wires and so in this round R only receives P 2 X 2 . Finally, R outputs M R = g(P 2 X 2 , C R ) and A outputs M A = g(P 2 Y 2 , A R ) and both halt. Fig.1 shows an execution of Π in presence of A.
Let E be the set of all executions of Π in presence of A. Consider a binary relation W over E, where (E,Ê) ∈ W if, (i) M S , C S are the same in the two executions; (ii) CÂ 0 ⊕ C A0 = 1; and (iii) CR = A R , AR = C R , where 'ˆ' in the superscript denotes the random coins used and messages output by A and R inÊ, respectively. Note that in the two executions, the t corrupted wires are swapped with the uncorrupted ones such that the messages received by A and R are swapped as shown in Fig.1 and 2 .
For any (E,Ê) ∈ W, the first round messages received by S in E andÊ are identical and equal to P 1 X 1 Y 1 . Thus in the second round, S will generate the same traffic
Let p E (pÊ resp.) denotes the probability that execution is E (Ê resp.). And denote by S ⊆ E the set of executions with M R = M S . From the reliability of Π, we will have
which contradicts the assumption on Π.
Note that an execution is completely determined by the messages selected by S and A, and the random coins of the players. Thus,
where r S , r R , r A are the lengths of the random coins of C S , C R , C A used in E, respectively, and r A = r A0 + r A1 = 1 + log |R| . Similarly, pÊ = 1 |M| 2 −r S −rR−rÂ , where rR = r R , and rÂ = rÂ 0 + rÂ 1 = 1 + log |R| . So p E = pÊ.
CASE 2 ["S − S"].
The intuition is that if S receives no transmission from R, A can impersonate R without being detected by S and so the privacy is broken. The proof strategy is similar to CASE 1. The difference is that in the first round when S's traffic is
The second round and the rest of the argument are similar to CASE 1. 
An outline of the proof follows. The proof is by contradiction: assume there exists an (ε, δ)-SMT-PD protocol Π; we construct an adversary that breaks either the privacy or the reliability of Π.
We note that A will succeed if it can successfully tamper with the transmission and cannot be detected by both S and R before the last round. Otherwise the two parties can use the wires that are known to both to be uncorrupted for transmission of the message in the remaining rounds. We construct an adversary below that can achieve this objective for the cases considered in the theorem.
One of the two participants can use the public channel once. A corrupts the first or the last t wires, and monitors the invocation of the public channel. (i) While the public channel has not been used, when a player P ∈ {S, R} sends a message, A replaces the traffic over the t corrupted wires by forged traffic that is constructed according to the protocol description. The receiverP ∈ {S, R} \ P of the message can not distinguish the corrupted from the uncorrupted part as the communication on both sets of t channels match the protocol description. (ii) When P uses the public channel, A blocks the messages over the corrupted wires. At this stageP will find out the t corrupted wires. (iii) After this round, A will block the traffic sent by P over the corrupted wires, and replaces the traffic sent byP over the same wires.
We show that the player P who invokes the public channel, is unable to identify the t corrupted wires by the end of the protocol.
(i) If P = S, we will show that S cannot distinguish two swapped executions in which he has the same views. If R outputs M R = M S in one execution then A can output M A = M S in the swapped execution and so using an argument similar to Theorem 1 we prove that the adversary can break the privacy of the protocol and thus obtain ε + δ ≥ 1 − 1 |M| .
(ii) If P = R, we will show R cannot distinguish two swapped executions in which he has the same views. If in one execution R outputs M S , he will output M A in the swapped execution with the same probability. If the two executions occur with identical probabilities then when M S = M A , we prove the adversary can break the reliability of the protocol and so obtain δ ≥ 
IV. A ROUND-OPTIMAL SMT-PD PROTOCOL
The (0, δ)-SMT-PD protocol in [5] is a (3, 2)-round protocol and so has optimal round complexity. Franklin and Wright [4] presented a 3-round (0, δ) SMT protocol for multi-cast networks in Broadcast Model. The protocol can be adapted to public discussion model resulting in a (3, 2)-round (0, δ)-SMT-PD protocol. However, both protocols have O(n) transmission rate over wires and public (or broadcast) channel.
In this section we propose a (3, 2)-round (0, δ)-SMT-PD protocol with constant transmission rate over public channel, and O(n) transmission rate over the wires. The protocol uses universal hash functions and can be seen as a variation of the protocol in [4] when adapted to public discussion model. 
A. The Construction
Wegman and Carter [13] constructed a 2 1−2 -almost strongly universal 2 hash family F = {h : {0, 1} m → {0, 1} }. Functions in F can be described by O( log m) bits and computed in polynomial time. The short description length of the family F allows us to authenticate messages with low communication complexity.
The protocol Π 1 transmits M S ∈ {0, 1} m to R and is described in Fig. 3 .
Moreover, Π 1 is polynomial time (in m and n) computable, and its transmission rate is O(n) over the wires and constant over the public channel when m = Ω(n 2 κ 2 ), where κ is the security parameter of the system with δ = (n − 1) [4] , [5] We noted that communication over public channel is more costly than communication over a wire and so minimizing the transmission rate over the public channel reduces the overall cost of the protocol. This is particularly important for transmitting long messages. For example in most cases κ = 30 would be sufficient while m could be much larger, e.g., 2 20 bits. When n = 30 wires are available, our proposed protocol transmits around 2 20 bits over the public channel with reliability higher than 1 − 2 −30 (since m > n 2 κ 2 ). However both protocols in [4] , [5] For i = 1, . . . , n, S randomly selects r i ∈ {0, 1} and R i ∈ {0, 1} m and sends the pair (r i , R i ) to R over wire C i . 
B. Comparisons with Schemes in
(S −→ R):
(S
